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COMMENT ON THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION OF BUSINESS
SUSAN M.

FRANZETI*

Professor Kellman's review of Seventh Circuit environmental law
decisions highlights an ironic twist of the off-stated criticism that the
Reagan years of environmental regulation were years of "nonregulation"
in which the interests of business were paramount to the interests of environmental protection. Agency nonfeasance is usually viewed as a benefit to industry. Industry allegedly escapes additional regulatory burdens
while environmental protection purportedly suffers from the lack of affirmative action.
However, these Seventh Circuit decisions show that agency inaction
or inadequate action can cause and has caused adverse effects upon business interests while not conferring any additional environmental benefit.
Two of the more broad-reaching Seventh Circuit cases reviewed arose
from inaction or inadequate action on the part of agencies of the executive branch, primarily the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).' The Seventh Circuit's response to such agency nonfeasance has been to police the agency's adherence to procedural requirements of the environmental laws rather than to fill the void left by the
agency's failings. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit has not provided a
very fruitful forum for the protection or advancement of business interests in the area of environmental law.
For business interests, an unfavorable resolution to environmental
litigation can be better than no resolution at all. As Professor Kellman
concludes, the Seventh Circuit has consistently avoided definitive resolution of substantive environmental law issues. The two National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) decisions analyzed typify the Seventh
Circuit's approach. 2 The impact on business interests is uncertainty concerning the application of statutory environmental requirements. The attendant burdens include an inability to engage in sound economic
Partner, Gardner, Carton & Douglas; J.D., cum laude, Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law, 1979.
1. Chicago Ass'n of Commerce & Indus. v. United States EPA, 873 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1989);
Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. United States EPA, 775 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1986); River Road Alliance v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985).
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planning and development without risk of running afoul of future substantive environmental decisions.
While the Seventh Circuit appears troubled by the agency's lack of
diligent pursuit of its statutorily delegated functions, the court has responded, at times necessarily, with a "cattle prod" rather than a "big
stick." Professor Kellman correctly notes the Seventh Circuit's reluctance to substitute its judgment for that of a government agency-a reluctance born of extensive legal precedent. 3 Arguably, judicial action in
the face of agency inaction does not usurp an agency's unexercised judgment. In the area of environmental law, however, the complex task that
frequently accompanies attempts to exercise that judgment is beyond the
resources and ability of a reviewing court. Of the cases discussed by Professor Kellman, Chicago Association of Commerce & Industry v. United
States EPA 4 best exemplifies the court's inability to act where the agency
has failed to act. The court's forced neutrality in this instance deals just
as adverse a blow to affected business interests as do cases where the
court has affirmatively denied direct challenges to agency action.
The "removal credit" provision of section 307(b) of the Clean Water
Act, 5 at issue in Chicago Association of Commerce & Industry, contains
one of the Act's most important provisions protecting industry's interests. Congress intended removal credits to apply to avoid redundant
treatment, i.e., treatment for treatment's sake. 6 The legislative history of
section 307(b) clearly shows that Congress intended that national pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers include a mechanism by
which Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) could modify (or re7
lax) these standards to reflect the POTW's own removal capability.
To realize the clear congressional intent to relieve industry from engaging in treatment for treatment's sake, the removal credits program
must operate in tandem with the promulgation by EPA of pretreatment
standards for indirect dischargers to POTWs. As compliance deadlines
near, indirect dischargers must incur the added expense of installing
wastewater treatment technology beyond that necessary to meet the standards that would be required if there was an operative removal credits
3.

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); Western Nebraska

Council v. United States EPA, 793 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1986); Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v.
United States EPA, 598 F.2d 228, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1979); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,
541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
4. 873 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1989).

5. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1988).
6. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, at 343 (1978).
7. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4424, 4463.
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program. An industrial facility foregoing such compliance risks potential enforcement action either by the regulatory agency or by the POTWs
charged with authority for enforcing compliance with the pretreatment
standards. Once the added capital and operational costs of unnecessary
treatment technology are expended by industry, these costs are not recoverable. The amount of the unnecessary expense incurred by industry
is further increased in those instances where industry provided essential
financial assistance to the local community to construct the POTW.
Such industrial financing was provided in the reasonable belief that the
need for and expense of redundant in-house industrial treatment would
be avoided or significantly reduced.
Since the 1986 decision by the Third Circuit invalidating the 1984
removal credits regulations, 8 EPA still has not fulfilled its nondiscretionary duty to promulgate the sludge regulations required to breathe renewed life into the removal credits program. In the interim, compliance
deadlines for various categories of pretreatment standards have come and
gone. Congressional intent has been thwarted and business has paid the
price.
The environment remains nonetheless protected in the face of EPA's
failure to act, because industry must comply with applicable pretreatment standards regardless of the high degree of pollutant removals
achieved by the POTWs receiving and further treating their wastewater.
An added environmental benefit was gained from the quickened pace of
the construction of improved or new POTWs made possible from the
financial assistance industry provided in return for expected removal
credits.
In Chicago Association of Commerce & Industry, the Seventh Circuit's frustration with EPA's inaction is plainly stated in Judge Cudahy's
opinion. A complete cure for the adverse effects on the business community caused by EPA's inaction lies in the promulgation of the sludge regulations-an extensive, technical and legal "doctoring" for which the
Seventh Circuit is ill-suited. Consequently, the plaintiff indirect dischargers were left with a sympathetic judicial opinion but no affirmative
relief. The plantiffs received no protection either from the uncertainty
caused by not knowing when EPA will promulgate sludge regulations or
from the cost of redundant treatment. The court's decision indicates that
where affirmative agency action is necessary to ensure the intended protection of business interests, the courts are a poor forum to achieve that
end.
8. NRDC v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987).
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A question arising from the Seventh Circuit's decision is whether
increased pressure to act could and should have been brought to bear on
EPA by the court's exercise of its equitable powers to grant a stay from
the enforcement of the pretreatment standards pending EPA's promulgation of the sludge regulations. A stay would be consistent with the congressional intent that redundant treatment is to be avoided. A stay
would also have served to relieve the affected industries both from the
risk of enforcement action and from the additional expense of redundant
treatment.
The Seventh Circuit's inaction in this regard, however, is not necessarily indicative of an antibusiness posture. A specific request for such a
stay was not before the court. Further, in the absence of any enforcement action against the affected indirect dischargers, it is arguable that
the issue of whether a stay should be granted was not ripe for review.
A truer test of the Seventh Circuit's posture toward business interests may come if the court is presented with a civil action based on the
pretreatment standards against indirect dischargers who would be in
compliance under an effective removal credits program. In such a case, a
cogent argument may be presented that EPA's failure to act has itself
created the discharger's alleged violation of the Clean Water Act. How
the Seventh Circuit resolves such a conflict would provide a much clearer
answer concerning the extent to which the regulated sector will be left to
bear the hardship caused by agency procrastination.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. United States EPA 9 exemplifies the court's willingness and ability to cure procedural deficiencies that render agency action inadequate
while avoiding the substantive issue. The court vacated EPA's decision
to deny Illinois' proposal to redesignate Kane and DuPage Counties as
attainment areas because EPA had failed to disclose and articulate the
policy on which it based the denial. In so doing, the Seventh Circuit
imposed a stricter standard of accountability upon EPA than courts who
have given greater deference to agency actions.
The court's remand to EPA was a partial victory for both the state
and the regulated sector. The decision affords greater protection to the
right of any interested party, including both business and nonbusiness
interests, to have a meaningful opportunity to comment on proposed
agency action. It is also consistent with the requirement of section 4(b)
of the Administrative Procedure Act, '0 that any final rulemaking contain
9. 775 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1985).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988).
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"a concise statement of basis and purpose."" Where an agency fails to
give notice of the particular guidelines, policies or methodology which it
is proposing in a given rule, it deprives interested parties of any meaningful opportunity to comment. 12 Inconsistencies and inadequacies of the
agency's proposed rulemaking often cannot be discerned unless the underlying rationale or methodology is disclosed. 13 Absent agency disclosure of its underlying rationale, the result can be a very one-sided
administrative record concerning the issues which form the basis for an
agency's final decision. The Seventh Circuit's decision rightfully works
toward a more even "playing field" when agency decisions are challenged
in the courts. It did not, however, decide who ultimately succeeds.
Professor Kellman expresses concern over the Seventh Circuit's remand to EPA because of the potentially arbitrary nature of divining a
"rational" policy based on an irrational statutory scheme of dividing the
United States into two hundred forty separate air quality control regions
(AQCR).14 Yet, the better course is not to avoid probing into the deficiencies that may exist in the statutory scheme by deferring to unexplained Agency action. Such an avoidance approach may sacrifice the
public's due process right to meaningful notice and comment while indirectly upholding an underlying, arbitrary statutory provision. No reasonable interests are served by such a result.
A more direct and adverse effect on business interests resulted from
the Seventh Circuit's decision not to address the substantive issuewhether EPA should have approved the redesignation request of the
State of Illinois. Existing businesses and those interested in doing business in DuPage or Kane Counties were left in a continued state of uncertainty concerning future business planning and development.
Under EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act, a major, new or
modified source cannot be constructed in a nonattainment area of a state
after June 30, 1979, unless that state has in place an approved state implementation plan (SIP) with an approved permitting procedure for
those major sources. Illinois' regulations adopting such procedures for
nonattainment areas had not been acted upon by EPA as of the State's
11. Id.
12. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
13. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), 423 U.S. 1025 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 1092 (1976) (remand to EPA
to disclose those specific scientific findings and data on which it relied so that comments may be
received).
14. Kellman, The Seventh Circuiton Environmental Regulation of Business, 65 CHi.-KENT L.
REv. 757, 779-80 (1990).
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appeal to the Seventh Circuit.1 5 Thus, EPA's inaction regarding these
pending Illinois regulations, coupled with the court's failure to approve
or disapprove EPA's inadequate denial of redesignation had two adverse
effects. It continued the prohibition against any major, new or modified
source construction in Kane or DuPage Counties. It also continued the
uncertainty as to what permitting procedures such construction would
have to satisfy in order to receive regulatory approval.
From an environmental protection perspective, the court's remand
served to maintain the nonattainment designation of Kane and DuPage
Counties until EPA abided by the court's direction to determine and disclose a rational decision regarding the State's redesignation request.
Hence, the environment remained "protected" and possibly "over-protected" depending upon whether Kane and DuPage Counties were ultimately deemed either attainment or nonattainment areas.
However, business received no answer to vital questions concerning
16
the economic growth and environment in DuPage and Kane Counties.
The court did not set a deadline by which EPA was to accomplish its
directive. In the meantime, the Clean Air Act's December 31, 1987
deadline for compliance with national primary air quality standards,
such as ozone, was fast approaching.' 7 With that deadline, and the continued nonattainment status, came the threatened ban on federal funds
for highway construction and sewage treatment plants. The continued
nonattainment status also precluded expansion or siting of new plants in
Kane and DuPage Counties. These threatened sanctions and the concomitant likelihood of increased emission controls, which also threatened
an increase in the cost of doing business in Kane and DuPage Counties,
were acknowledged but unresolved by the court. I" The Seventh Circuit's
decision to remand without approval or disapproval of the State's redesignation request denied business any measure of certainty upon which to
plan for the future.
The pursuit of a degree of certainty for business interests subject to
environmental regulation fares only slightly better in the Seventh Circuit
15. 49 PCB Op. 111, R81-16, Docket B.
16. Ultimately, the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce (ISCC) resorted to a petition for mandamus to the Seventh Circuit when, by the fall of 1988, the EPA still had not complied with the
court's remand. See In the Matter of Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, No. 88-3070 (7th Cir.
Oct. 21, 1988). The ISCC and the EPA subsequently agreed upon a schedule by which the EPA
would complete the agency action. On August 4, 1989, the EPA ultimately denied the State's redesignation request. 54 Fed. Reg. 32,078 (1989).
17. Section 172(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2) (1982).
18. Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. United States EPA, 775 F.2d at 1142 n.2 (7th Cir.
1985).
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decisions under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 1 9 Affirmative relief was indirectly obtained by the commercial barge fleeting
operation in River Road Alliance v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.20 However, in Van Abbema v. Fornell,2 1 another panel of the court
resolved a similar issue in a different fashion. These different resolutions
create uncertainty as to how business interests will fare under NEPA
before the Seventh Circuit. Depending upon which panel of the Seventh
Circuit is hearing the case, commercial ventures that trigger NEPA's application may or may not have to withstand strict judicial scrutiny. Most
significant to business interests is the court's interpretation of the degree
to which the regulatory agency has reviewed and evaluated available
alternatives.
Judge Cudahy's commitment in Van Abbema to uphold the accountability of the environmental planning process does not alone create
an unreasonable burden upon business interests. An environmentally
sound commercial venture should withstand such scrutiny. But, whether
or not the agency conducts a sufficient evaluation under NEPA of alternatives to the proposed action is not a matter within the control of private business interests. Given the Seventh Circuit's inconsistent views on
what constitutes a "sufficient evaluation of alternatives," the business
sector is again left with a significant degree of uncertainty as to what
agency conduct, and hence, which commercial ventures, will pass NEPA
review in the eyes of the Seventh Circuit.
Faced with the results of affirmative agency action, Judge Posner's
decision in River Road Alliance found that action adequate. Judge Posner provided resolution to the immediate controversy at hand-the
Corps of Engineer's issuance of a permit to conduct a temporary barge
fleeting operation was affirmed. The barge fleeting operator could proceed to conduct its business as planned under a valid permit.
Yet, Professor Kellman strongly criticizes Judge Posner's means of
resolving the operator's uncertainty as to how it would be allowed to
conduct its barge fleeting business. Specifically, Professor Kellman
views Judge Posner's resolution as a distortion of NEPA's purpose and
intended protection of aesthetic values. Some words in limited defense of
the added certainty afforded by Judge Posner's decision are offered here
in rebuttal.
NEPA has been described by the Supreme Court as an "essentially
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982).
20. 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1055 (1986).

21. 807 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1986).
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procedural" statute. 22 As the District of Columbia Circuit further explained in Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency :23
"[T]he harm with which courts must be concerned in NEPA cases is not,
strictly speaking, harm to the environment, but rather the failure of decision-makers to take environmental factors into account in the way that
NEPA mandates."' 24 Judge Posner's scrutiny of whether the Corps of
Engineers had properly taken environmental factors into account as required by NEPA, rather than scrutinizing the Corps' conclusion that no
significant environmental harm would result, is consistent with NEPA's
purpose.
As Judge Posner properly found, the Corps considered the aesthetic
impact of the fleeting project, as it must under NEPA. His decision that
the extent of the Corps' consideration was sufficient seems to be based
more on a recognition of the essentially subjective nature of that analysis
than on the promotion of unconstrained, efficient commercial development. Judge Posner acknowledges that aesthetic values must and should
be evaluated. He also reasonably questions what added benefit or decisional assistance is to be gained from the additional time and expense of a
more extensive study of an ultimately subjective judgment. That judgment is within the agency's discretion and few, if any, objective standards
exist to guide a court's "hard look" review. Judge Posner's reluctance to
apply the "hard look" doctrine to aesthetic environmental factors, because of the analytical difficulties they present, is supported by similar
25
judicial decisions under NEPA.
Environmental planning need not always be the time-consuming
process Professor Kellman advocates. The NEPA regulations state that:
"[u]ltimately, of course, it is not better documents but better decisions
that count. NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork--even excel'26
lent paperwork-but to foster excellent action.
How is anyone better off expending the cost and time of preparing
an environmental impact statement that is not likely to provide a better
record or better-reasoned decision? Taking a cue from the Clean Water
Act, "study for study's sake" is not NEPA's intent.
22. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
23. 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).

24. Id. at 512.
25. See Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv.,
487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord,City of New Haven v. Chandler, 446 F. Supp. 925 (D. Conn.
1978); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 484
F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973).

26. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (c) (1989).
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CONCLUSION

As Professor Kellman aptly concludes, the decisions discussed
herein do not reveal the Seventh Circuit as a pro- or anti-environment
court. The lack of any discernible position on environmental policy by
the Seventh Circuit results in perhaps its most significant impact on business interests. Particularly in cases where the regulatory agency has
failed to act or taken inadequate action, the court's tendency toward
avoidance of substantive decisions makes the Seventh Circuit an unattractive forum for business. Indeed, in such cases, the more likely result
is that the business sector will know no more about resolving the environmental law controversy at hand after it has been to the Seventh Circuit than before it demanded its "day in court."

